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Abstract This article deals with the emergence of Futures
Research after 1945 and its production of future expertise. The
field of futures research (or futures studies/futurology ) was
conceptualised in a process of circulating knowledge in
Western Europe and the USA during the 1950s and 1960s.
These approaches to thinking about, forecasting and planning
the future drew their arsenal of new methods largely from the
field of cybernetics (such as Systems Analysis). What is more,
futures research produced expertise for policy development and
strategic planning. As a result of the dynamic changes in
science and technology and the breakthrough of
Keynesianism, the 1960s symbolized the high time of political
planning in Western Europe and the USA. The paper aims to
analyse the forms and character of future expertise utilized in
government and administration during the 1960s. It will focus
on West German futures research and its advisory role for the
Federal Government but will also take transnational transfers of
knowledge and comparative aspects into account. The paper
will show that major strands of futures research of the 1960s
were explicitly confident that they would be able to plan and
control the future by using “modern” and rational methods.
This led partly to a euphoria of steering. In the early 1970s,
however, this confidence was shattered. One reason for this
were dramatic problems in utilizing future expertise in
government.
Keywords History of futures research/Future(s) studies/
Futurology/Zukunftsforschung . Cybernetics . Systems
analysis . Federal Government . Scientific policy advice .
Early warning system . Can-do mind-set
In 1967, Olaf Helmer of the RAND Corporation published an
article on “Long range forecasting”, which began as follows:
“The decade of the Sixties has brought with it an im-
portant change in the intellectual climate throughout
many parts of the world, evidenced by a new attitude
toward the future that has become apparent in public and
private planning agencies as well as in the research
community. The effect has been to extend customary
planning horizons into a more distant future and to
replace haphazard intuitive gambles, as a basis for plan-
ning, by sober and craftsmanlike analysis of the oppor-
tunities the future has to offer. […] The future is no
longer viewed as unique, unforeseeable, and inevitable;
there are, instead, a multitude of possible futures, with
associated probabilities that can be estimated and, to
some extent, manipulated.” [42 Helmer, p 1–2].
Very similarly, and influenced by circulating knowledge,
the West German Centre Berlin for Futures Research
(Zentrum Berlin für Zukunftsforschung ) propagated in a
founding paper in 1968: “One begins to realise that there is
a wealth of possible futures and that these possibilities can be
shaped in different ways”.1
Evidently, the new meta-discipline of futures research was
built on the assumption that a multitude of possible futures
existed, which could be estimated, forecast and manipulated.
Seen from this perspective, it seemed feasible to steer future
developments. This aim had a somehow euphoric touch and
was very close to aspirations propagated by actors in the
political field. The West German Social Democratic Party
1 First information broschure of the “Zentrum Berlin für
Zukunftsforschung”(Centre Berlin for Futures Research ), undated
(1968), Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 138, 1550
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(SPD), part of the “grand coalition”, propagated in its
“Perspectives” in early 1969:
“The status of science today allows us to look ahead. A
form of politics oriented towards the future must be
inspired by the will to prevent noticeable and undesir-
able developments, to tackle at an early stage noticeable
and undesirable developments, but above all: to recog-
nise, to promote and to initiate desirable developments.”
[93 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, p 33].
The Social Democratic Party was more or less confident
that science would possess the tools needed to systematically
anticipate possible, probable and “willed” futures, thus pro-
viding the knowledge for future-oriented politics, for modern-
ization and planning. Did futures research provide scientific
policy advice? Which forms of knowledge were utilized in
government and what were the effects of this future expertise?
This article explores the “founding years” of modern futures
research in Western industrialised countries emerging in the
late 1950s and 1960s (I.).2 It furthermore sheds light on the
forms of knowledge produced as well as the ways and extent
to which this expertise was utilized for government and ad-
ministration in the late 1960s and early 1970s (II.) This second
chapter focuses onWest German futures research but also takes
transnational transfers of knowledge into account. Expertise is
understood here as an informed, though not necessarily scien-
tific, knowledge with a link to political decision-making and
solving of relevant social problems [83 Saretzky]. It should be
kept in mind here that scientific knowledge is never incorpo-
rated into the political process on a one-to-one basis, but that the
communication channels, the flow and diffusion of knowledge
between the experts, politics and administration are of episte-
mological interest [8 Ash; 36 Gieryn; 106 Weiss; 10 Beck &
Bonß; 80 Ronge; 104 Weingart 1983]. This is also true for the
public sphere(s). As scientific knowledge is always inextricably
linked with its cultural and social contexts, recent research
focuses on the mutual influencing processes and interactions
between science, politics and the public arena [23 Daston; 28
Felt; 86 Schirrmacher; 105 Weingart].
The article aims at showing that future thinking in the 1960s
was dominated by ideas of feasibility (Machbarkeitsdenken)
and some sort of technological optimism, as most exponents of
the futures field were confident that they would be able to plan
and steer the future by using “modern” and rational methods.
Driven by a can-do mind-set, this led partly to a euphoria of
steering. In the early 1970s, however, this confidence was
shattered. One reason for this were dramatic problems in
utilizing future expertise in government and administration.
Central strands of futures research in the 1970s developed a
more pragmatic understanding of thinking about, forecasting
and planning the future.
The emergence of futures research in western
industrialized countries in the 1950s and 1960s
Of course, forecasting the future was nothing new in the 1950s
and can be traced back in history. In the 18th century, as the
historian Reinhart Koselleck argued, the horizons of expecta-
tion were separated from the spaces of experience.
Teleological interpretations and Christian expectations of sal-
vation were superseded by notions of an open future and the
belief in “worldly” progress. Prophecies were superseded by
prognostics. This was crucial for modern temporal conscious-
ness and self-consciousness, for social and political develop-
ments, as the “saddle period” (Sattelzeit ) opened up the floor
to plans and utopias [60 Koselleck]. In the industrial age
people came to believe that the study of the natural and social
world would help themmake progress and “gain some kind of
control over the passing of time”. Rationality, science and
technology seemed to allow control over nature and enable
people to plan and steer the future [45 Hunt, p 25]. The
intertwining of technological changes and thoughts about the
future might be traced in any historical period [45 Hunt], but
was especially noticeable in the decade from the late 1950s to
the late 1960s.
Hence, it was this time when “modern” futures research
was conceptualised in the USA and Western Europe.
Generally, futures research grew out of dynamic develop-
ments in science and technology in a Techno-Scientific Age.
These developments were inextricably linked with the Second
World War and the emerging Cold War. During the Second
World War, the British Royal Navy and the US Office of
Scientific Research and Development designed new tech-
niques and tools of military planning by using mathematical
knowledge labelled as Operations Research .3 After 1945, in
the shadow of the Manhattan Project and the emerging Cold
War, the US government in particular relied on so-called Big
Science which meant that governments funded large-scale
projects managed by universities and research institutes,
employing hundreds or thousands of scientists and technicians
2 The history of “Western” futures research remained a desideratum of
interdisciplinary and historical research until the early 2000s. For an
inside, albeit fruitful, perspective, see 21 Cornish; 62 Kreibich, Canzler
& Baumeister; 94 Steinmüller, and 12 Bell. For recent studies see 87
Schmidt-Gernig; 88 Schmidt-Gernig; 7 Andersson; 89–91 Seefried.
3 Carroll Wilson of OSRD defined Operations Research as “de-
veloping tactics for the most effective use of equipment and
forces [and conducting] equipment analysis which is concerned
with […] obtaining maximum performance from equipment
through improvement of installation, maintenance, calibration,
and testing procedures”. Quoted in 78 Rau, p 77; see further 58
Kirby, p 66–92; 31 Fortun & Schweber; 75 Pircher.
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on an interdisciplinary basis [34 Galison & Hevly; 67 Leslie].
These think tanks, such as the RAND Corporation, provided
the methods and techniques for the military and strategic
planning of US administrations [1 Abella; 5 Amadae; 20
Collins]. Methodologically, these new methods were based
on the theoretical foundations of behaviourism, and they drew
their arsenal mainly from two new theories developed in close
proximity to the think tanks. These were, on the one hand,
game theory as an approach to estimating strategic decisions
in conflict situations [73 Neumann & Morgenstern; 66
Leonard], and, on the other hand, cybernetics as the new
meta-science of communication and control in animate and
inanimate systems. Stating that biological, technological, and
social systems behave quite similarly in that they are struc-
tured by transfers of information, cybernetics explored regu-
lation and control mechanisms and information flows within
complex systems and between the system and its environ-
ment. From a natural science point of view, cybernetics
seemed to be a meta-approach to understanding how systems
behave, how they “learn” by integrating new information and
how they can be steered [107, 108 Wiener; 39 Hagner; 49
Heims; 92 Schmidt-Gernig]. At RAND, Systems Analysis was
designed as a cybernetics-inspired science of strategy which
laid the foundations for methods such as systems-based com-
puter simulations, war gaming and a systematic analysis of
experts’ opinions on specific future developments (the so-
called Delphi method) to forecast the future.4
However, the think tanks only provided the methods. Ideas
to conceptualise futures research as a meta-discipline to think
about, forecast and plan the future grew out of transatlantic
circulations of knowledge. The central forum was the
Congress for Cultural Freedom. Shaped by the mentalities of
the Cold War, the Congress brought together intellectuals,
scientists and politicians under the aegis of consensus liberal-
ism. As such, the Congress promoted consensual democracy,
liberal capitalism and anti-Marxism but also pleaded for plan-
ning and reform policy. The Congress was supported by the
CIA and closely connected with the Ford Foundation which
projected a philanthropic interest but in fact had also other,
very much political aims. It sought to anchor a positive image
of American culture in the West and in the so-called Third
World, also linking European social sciences more closely
with the American social sciences and modernization theory,
which epitomized a “framework for objective social analysis
and a powerful vehicle for social engineering” [63 Latham, p
2; further 19 Coleman; 44 Hochgeschwender; 92 Seybold; 14
Berghahn pp 153–70, 183–31]. A key role in these networks
played the French political scientist Bertrand de Jouvenel,
who provided the theoretical reflection on thinking about the
future. He was inspired by circulating knowledge of US
intellectuals such as Daniel Bell who emerged as one of the
intellectual “founders” of futures research in the USA by
presiding over the US Commission on the Year 2000.5
Furthermore, emigrants acted as contact people such as Olaf
Helmer who connected the epistemological foundations
from the German school of logistical empiricism with
methodology knowledge from RAND [79 Rescher].
Consequently, futures research institutions were set up
in the 1960s, f.e. the “Institute for the Future” in the
USA and the “Centre Berlin for Futures Research” in
West Germany [70 McHale & McHale].
All those researchers who conceptualised the scientific
approaches to the future in the late 1950s and 1960s shared
three characteristics. First, they perceived that the pace of
technological, scientific and social change was accelerating.
An exponential growth of scientific knowledge was noted in
the fields of aerospace research, nuclear energy and data
processing. Given the perception of acceleration, the know-
ledge of the past seemed to offer less and less that was useful
for solving future problems. Thus, the acknowledgement of
acceleration was bound up with a concern for how to control
future developments [13 Berger; 25 de Jouvenel, p 23–4; 53
Jungk, p 9].
However, and this is the second characteristic, the growth
of scientific knowledge also seemed to offer specific methods
and new tools for researching and controlling rapid change in
its complexity and in the medium to long term. This was, on
the one hand, the computer by saving big data for simulating
future developments [4 Agar], and, on the other hand, cyber-
netics. Cybernetics was hyped as the newmeta-science, which
promised to unify knowledge across the boundaries separating
the natural from the social sciences and the humanities, and as
a technique for analysing internal processes of systems by
exploring feedback loops, thus enabling people to estimate
and somehow steer the future development of whole systems
[39 Hagner; 97 Tanner]. Hence, futures research was domi-
nated by the confidence that science could forecast future
developments of systems and future consequences of deci-
sions and thus steer the future towards some sort of progress.
4 At RAND, Systems Analysis was understood as a science of strategy,
referring to the “complex problem of choice among alternative future
systems, where the degrees of freedom and the uncertainties are large,
where the difficulty lies as much in deciding what ought to be done as in
how to do it”: 98 The RANDCorporation, p. 27; cf pp 26–28; 20 Collins
2002, pp 170–173; 35 Ghamari-Tabrizi 2000, pp 171–2, 209–11; for
“Delphi” 37 Gordon/Helmer.
5 25 De Jouvenel; see correspondence between Daniel Bell and de
Jouvenel. Bibliothèque Nationale de France, NAF 28143, 294;
Congress for Cultural Freedom, Minutes of the Second Meeting of the
Planning Committee on Tradition and Social Changes- Social Progress,
8th Feb 1958, ibid, 34; Ford Foundation Archives, Grant File 61–41; 11
Bell; 7 Andersson, pp. 1417–8; 22 Dard, pp 327 ff
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This perception was bound up with the third, most impor-
tant characteristic. All exponents of the futures field were
driven by the conviction that many possible futures existed
to think about and to be created. Bertrand de Jouvenel coined
the term futuribles , combining “future” and “possible”,
around 1960 [25 de Jouvenel, p 35]. Hence, the plural of
“futures” epitomized a central principle of all Western con-
cepts of studying the future. This perception was grounded in
different factors. De Jouvenel emphasised in an epistemolog-
ical sense that there could be no real knowledge about the
future. Nonethless, humans could identify desirable futures
and actively strive to bring them about. Thus, the image of the
open and many futures stemmed from the idea that many
futures are creatable and that people can “choose” their own,
willed future [25 de Jouvenel, pp 17–32; 6 Andersson]; this
reflected a sort of “spirit of optimism”(Aufbruchstimmung) in
the 1960s. Furthermore, the perception of many futures was
linked to a ColdWar context: in the West, the future should be
planned but was at the same time open and not determined like
from a Marxist point of view.
As mentioned above, futures research was conceptualised
by intellectuals and scientists from different disciplines, driven
by different methodological viewpoints and ideas, and this
was one reason for different labels epitomizing scientific
approaches to forecasting, planning and thinking about the
future. Whereas Futures Research was more focused on sci-
entific methods, on forecasting and planning, in the USA the
term Futurology circulated in a more populist sense, whereas
Ossip Flechtheim in the Federal Republic of Germany sought
to emphasise the explicit academic character of Futurologie .
In the 1970s Futures Studies gained the upper hand as a term
that was broader and sought to encompass all aspects of
thinking about, forecasting and planning “futures” [69
Masini; 43 Helmer; 29, 30 Flechtheim].
Hence, the field of futures research was fluid. Three differ-
ent approaches in the 1960s can be identified. First, an empir-
ical and positivistic approach to futures research dominated
the scene in the 1960s. Driven by positivism on the level of
epistemology and, mostly, by behaviourism, this technology-
based approach was mostly epitomized by natural scientists
and social scientists. They used trend extrapolations, scenarios,
and computer simulations to forecast future developments.
One main protagonist was the US futurist Herman Kahn. He
was known for so-called war gaming, constructing somehow
cynical scenarios about the likely consequences of nuclear war.
He argued, confident about the modes of forecasting: “a real-
istic war game may predict the future, or at least some aspects
of it, quite accurately” [56 Kahn & Mann, p 11–2; see also 57
Kahn; 48 Jantsch]. In West Germany, the Centre Berlin for
Futures Research was established by exponents epitomizing
the empirical and positivistic approach. When it was founded
in 1968, the Centre propagated: “Wewould like to find accept-
able solutions for problems hampering progress of civilisation
or that must be reckoned with in the foreseeable future”.6 The
chief executive of the Centre Heinz Hermann Koelle was
particularly shaped by technological optimism and an idea of
feasibility (Machbarkeitsdenken ). The aerospace engineer,
who had moved to the USA together with Wernher von
Braun in the 1950s, had worked at the NASA George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center. After returning to Berlin in
1965, he was engaged in implementing Systems Engineering
as a new course of study at the Free University Berlin. In this
respect, it was not surprising that Koelle claimed that the
Centre Berlin should use computer-based systems analysis
which was to be “action-orientated” as well as providing
“political decision support”.7
A second, normative and ontological approach was
characterised by reflecting on the future in the framework of
a holistic world view. Bertrand de Jouvenel and the German
physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker thought about possi-
ble and willed futures in a historical and philosophical per-
spective, searching for moral ideas of the “good” future and
aiming at ordering the social and technological acceleration in
a normative perspective. Despite all insecurities it seemed
necessary to think about and develop alternative futures so
that willed futures could come close to probable futures and
there would be sufficient time to plan and act flexibly.
“Prévoir suppose que l’on ait d’abord regardé. Well: foresee-
ing depends on looking”, de Jouvenel declared.8 Both com-
bined scepticism regarding technology and confidence in the
potential of modern science and technology in an ambivalent
way, and both understood the futures field as an art, highlight-
ing in Aristotelian tradition the individual skills of the intel-
lectuals thinking about the future in an ontological mode. This
was the reason why both avoided using the terms “futures
research” and “futurology” but instead spoke of the “art of
anticipation” (de Jouvenel) and “Mellontik” [ancient Greek
for “in the process of”] (von Weizsäcker).9
A third, critical and emancipatory approach was shaped
by idealistic, somewhat utopian viewpoints, as epitomized by
the German-Austrian historian Robert Jungk, the German
political scientist Ossip K. Flechtheim and the Norwegian
philosopher and father of peace research Johan Galtung.
They were all shaped by a social philosophical and critical
6 First information broschure of “Zentrum Berlin für Zukunftsforschung”
(Centre Berlin for Futures Research), undated (1968), Bundesarchiv,
B 138, 1550.
7 Heinz Hermann Koelle, Minutes of the Vorstands-Meeting Centre
Berlin for Futures Research, 9th July 1970, Archives of the Institut für
Zeitgeschichte, ED 701, 41; see 59 Koelle.
8 Bertrand de Jouvenel to Edward Cornish, 4th Jan 1975, Bibliothèque
Nationale de France, NAF 28143, 297; see 25 de Jouvenel 1967; 101 von
Weizsäcker; 102 von Weizsäcker.
9 De Jouvenel 1967; Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, additional paper on
founding a Max Planck Inst i tute “zur Untersuchung der
Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt”, 15th Feb
1968, Bundesarchiv, B 196, 7168; 102 von Weizsäcker.
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epistemology that was close to Critical Theory, and they were
moulded by an understanding of society that focused on
human beings, an awareness of the development of time in
history and a historical-dialectic approach to science, which
reflected the role of the scientist in the cognitive process.
Moreover, this approach stemmed from a branch of the polit-
ical left which aspired to emancipate human beings from the
constrictive political, economic and spiritual structures of the
“system”, and thus it was also tied up with emerging peace
research. Jungk had published the bestseller “Die Zukunft hat
schon begonnen: Amerikas Allmacht und Ohnmacht”
(“Tomorrow is already here”) in 1952, in which he accused
US civilization of an excessive belief in technological progress,
domesticating both nature and man [50 Jungk]. In the 1960s he
still rejected atomic weapons, but was more open for the prom-
ises of the Technical Age. Similarly to Galtung and Flechtheim,
he voted in a utopian mode for a “homo novus” (New Man)
creating his own future and combining planning and participa-
tion [51 Jungk, p. 515; cf 52, 53 Jungk; 55 Jungk&Galtung; 91
Seefried, p 159–62]. Principally, this approach was inextricably
linked with ideas of participation and civil society, stimulating
new social movements on a transnational and global scale
emerging in the 1960s [109 Wittner; 7 Andersson].
Generally speaking, “Western” futures research in the late
1950s and 1960s was bound up with an idea of feasibility,
aiming at combining forecasting and planning a better future.
This understanding was part and parcel of the intrinsic code of
futures research, encapsulating the principle of cybernetics as
a method for transgressing the boundaries separating episteme
and techne [39 Hagner p 38–9]. This does not mean that the
futures field was shaped by endless optimism as futurists were
also aware of the risks that came along with modernity and its
perceived accelerated change. However, they were confident
that the “futures”were open and could be planned and steered,
and this was mostly combined with a positive understanding
of technological progress.
Producing future expertise
Current research on political culture in Western industrialized
countries has emphasized that political orientations towards
planning and modernization prospered during the 1960s due
to the economic “golden age”, the rapid growth of science and
technology and the breakthrough of Keynesianism [99 van
Laak; 27 Doering-Manteuffel; 71, 72 Metzler; 18 Cazes; 74
O’Hara]. In West Germany, conceptions of central planning
had been perceived more or less negatively in the 1950s. This
was especially due to West German perceptions of the GDR,
as the planning principle in itself seemed to epitomize some
sort of planned economy (Planwirtschaft ). This changed in
the mid-1960s. The economic boom played a central role as it
seemed to offer new possibilities for action. West German
politics came under the sway of new spirit of reform and
modernisation, which also aided in the breakthrough of the
Keynesian paradigm [72Metzler, pp 225–366; 81 Ruck]. And
this was true both for Social Democrats and Liberals, even for
many Christian Democrats and conservative politicians with
visions of conservative “modernity” coming to the fore.
Politicians from different parties argued that social and tech-
nical change had altered the requirements of politics tremen-
dously. Thus it seemed to be necessary for politics to control
this change actively, absorbing its implications. Hence, plan-
ning attained a somehow enigmatic image in Western indus-
trialized countries, being linked to progress, modernity and “a
view of the world at once positivistic, linear and rational,
celebrating the machine” [74 O’Hara, p 1; see also 72
Metzler; 95 Süß]. “Rational” politics became a discursive
leitmotiv [72 Metzler, p 209–10], and in this rationality could
mean both seeking objectivity and the best solution as well as
enabling people to decide on a free, reasoned and “enlight-
ened” basis. Hence, planning was linked to some sort of
“scientization” of politics, as politics relied more than ever
before on scientific and experts’ advice [82 Rudloff; generally
77 Raphael].
This met with the aim of futures research to not only do
research on the future but also to shape it. It is thus not surprising
that futures research tried to contribute its expertise to politics in
the 1960s, as will be demonstrated using the following examples
of West German futures research and the Federal Government.
This applied most by far to the empirical-positivist approach.
First, the protagonists of the critical -emancipatory ap-
proach refrained from providing scientific advice to the gov-
ernment. These futurists focused on having an impact on the
critical public (in the understanding of Jürgen Habermas), on
civil society and social movements. Hence, Jungk and
Galtung founded “Mankind 2000”, a transnational organisa-
tion engaged in thinking about and visualising coming peace
and human development transgressing the boundaries of the
ColdWar. Initially, Jungk planned to organize an international
exhibition entitled “AWorld at Peace” in London in 1964.10
The exhibition was designed to deal with utopias of a peaceful
future and “visions of a better world” [54 Jungk, p 360]. This
plan failed but with Galtung’s support Mankind 2000 was set
up as a transnational network. Mankind oscillated between
acting as an epistemic community and a social movement,
from which the “World Future Studies Federation” emerged
at the beginning of the 1970s.11 Furthermore, Jungk
10 Keith Robins, Report of Sub-Commission on Conferences,
International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace. Report of the
Inaugural Congress held at Tyringe, Sweden, Jan 1964, Archives of the
Institut für Zeitgeschichte, ED 702, 52.
11 Summary of Decisions reached at the Mankind 2000 International
Meeting held at William Penn House on 24th May 1966. Robert Jungk
Bibliothek Salzburg; 55 Jungk & Galtung; 91 Seefried, pp 195ff; for
“epistemic communities” 38 Haas.
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concentrated on making an impact on the public by
means of publications and on discussing “willed fu-
tures” with students as a lecturer at the “Technische
Universität” in Berlin. From this emerged the concept
of future workshops (Zukunftswerkstätten ). In a multi-
level model, which in some ways embodied a link
between brainstorming and the Delphi method, people
were supposed to “invent” their future, i.e. creatively
develop it by discussing social problems in a dynamic
group process, gathering ideas for solutions and exam-
ining their application [24 Dator; 33 Gabor; 91 Seefried,
p 167–8].
From the second field, of the normative -ontological ap-
proach, Carl Friedrich vonWeizsäcker, who believed he had a
particular social and political duty as an atomic physicist,
continually pushed the boundaries between the functional
systems of science and politics. One way in which he did this
was via the public, for example by initiating the Göttingen
Declaration of Atomic Physicists in 1957. The arcane field of
politics became even more important for him, however, as he
focused on having a political impact as an expert. Hence, he
entered into the public sphere especially when he aimed at
increasing the pressure to act on political actors via the media
[61 Kraus; 91 Seefried, pp 96–7, 178–9, 349–51]. In the mid-
1960s vonWeizsäcker extended his thoughts from the “atomic
age” to the whole “technical age” [101 von Weizsäcker]. In
general, von Weizsäcker regarded the technical development,
with its “rapid tempo”, ambivalently [102 Weizsäcker, p 68].
On the one hand, the new “basic sciences” from the sphere of
the think tanks, such as cybernetics and games theory, fasci-
nated him. On the other hand, he was well aware of the
problematic consequences of technical progress, as was
reflected in atomic physics. In order to assess the ambivalent
consequences of science and technology for the future, he
planned in 1967 to found a “Max Planck Institute for
Research into Living Conditions in a Scientific-Technical
World”. The Institute was designed, on the one hand, to do
research on the new basic sciences such as cybernetics, and on
the other hand to address special topics of direct political
relevance, such as global food production and the deterrence
system. The Institute should in particular advise the executive
in related factual issues.12 The Federal Minister of Research
Gerhard Stoltenberg supported this plan as he was especially
interested in “modern” techniques and knowledge produced at
the US Think Tanks. However, vonWeizsäcker‘s Max Planck
Institute could not be completely realised. His concept en-
countered resistance from industry representatives in the sen-
ate of the Max Planck Institute, which feared that the industry
could be restricted in its innovative freedom by “leftist” ex-
ponents of futures research and peace research. Von
Weizsäcker was thus forced to limit the Max-Planck-Institute
in Starnberg in its advisory capacity and to reduce its size [91
Seefried, p 351–4; 64 Leendertz, p 20; 32 Futurologie].
The project “War Consequences and War Prevention”
of the Max Planck Institute attained particular political
significance. It had already been begun under the aegis
of von Weizsäcker in the research department of the
“Association of German Academics (Vereinigung Deutscher
Wissenschaftler )”, supported by the Volkswagen Foundation.
This project examined in various scenarios the effects
of a nuclear war on West German territory [2 Afheldt]. A
task force designed a computer-assisted simulation model
that divided the territory of West Germany into zones and
forecast in war scenarios potential human losses, health casu-
alties and housing and industrial costs. Furthermore, the group
dealt with the deterrent strategy and developed scenarios for
ranges of variations of strike likelihoods of new weapons,
such as anti-ballistic missiles. The simulations showed that
in none of the scenarios did the Federal Republic possess a
real defensive potential, i.e. the capacity to prevent an oppo-
nent from carrying out his threat by use of military means.
Ultimately, the group drew up three global qualitative scenar-
ios: a duopoly as the most obvious option would suffer from
the difficulty of maintaining the balance between the two
powers. A monopoly as the second scenario was barely con-
ceivable without a large-scale war. The third option was a
global political system consolidated by international organi-
sations that would initiate disarmament [103 von Weizsäcker;
3 Afheldt]. This option had already been designed by von
Weizsäcker in 1963 entitled “Weltinnenpolitik” [100 von
Weizsäcker, p 131]. Thus, the project confirmed von
Weizsäcker’s thesis, that technical developments made a per-
manent stabilisation of the deterrent system almost impossi-
ble. From an epistemological point of view, the project had
admittedly been designed in such a way that a confirmation of
von Weizsäcker ’s theses was not very surprising.
Fundamentally, however, the project successfully connected
peace research and futures research, and it had both a norma-
tive and an action-orientated reference point. As it questioned
the deterrent system and called for promoting détente, the
study backed the architects of the new eastern policy (Neue
Ostpolitik ), the new Chancellor Willy Brandt and State
Secretary Egon Bahr, with whom von Weizsäcker stood in
contact.13 However, this project led von Weizsäcker and the
Max Planck Institute further into the realm of peace (and not
futures) research [see 46 Hutchinson & Inayatullah].
12 Von Weizsäcker, Bargmann, von Bismarck, Heimpel, Gerlach,
Heisenberg, Vorschlag zur Gründung eines Max-Planck-Instituts zur
Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen
Welt, 1st Nov 1967; von Weizsäcker, Ergänzungen zu dem Antrag,
15th Feb 1968. Bundesarchiv, B 196, 7168.
13 Weizsäcker to Brandt, 21th March 1972, and correspondence with
Egon Bahr. Archives of the Max Planck Society, Weizsäcker Papers,
Files 6 and 15.
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Third, protagonists from the field of an empirical-positivist
approach attempted most strongly to provide scientific policy
advice. The Centre Berlin for Futures Research actively of-
fered itself up for advising politics. The Centre claimed that it
could draw up research planning modelling but also be active
in the fields of budget planning as well as constructing traffic
planning models, population models and global government
models.14 It is clear that it was no longer the object – the
“what” – that was decisive but the “how”: any topic appeared
to be workable because in the centre of focus was the method,
and here, above all, the computer-based simulation model.
The Centre Berlin established contact in particular with the
new planning department of the Federal Chancellery. The
planning department had been set up against the backdrop of
fresh scientific, political and also media interest in a “modern”
and “rational” form of governance. The Chancellery had
already come under fire during the “grand coalition” 1966 to
1969: it allegedly fulfilled its duties as an organ of coordina-
tion, information and control insufficiently, as it forewent
“modern leadership staffs”, “political planning and systematic
data management” [110 Zundel; see 95 Süß]. Therefore, from
1967 on, a new planning staff should ponder the planning of
procedures, i.e. the organisation of political processes, as well
as task scheduling, i.e. coordination of fields of activity with
regard to a catalogue of aims. This was bound up with setting
up the “Project Group for Government and Administrative
Reform”. That panel, consisting of representatives of the
Chancellery and other ministries, was to submit proposals
for better coordination between the individual ministries [96
Süß]. The Brandt government which came to power in 1969
then expanded the planning staff into a planning department.
This was completely in line with the proposed reform policy:
according to Willy Brandt in his first government declaration,
the government had to “begin with itself when talking of
reforms”. The Federal Chancellery and the ministries should
be “modernised in their structures and thus in their work” [17
Brandt, p 261]. Subsequently, Chancellery Minister Horst
Ehmke, who acted with a striking, technically-friendly reform
vigour, turned the planning policy into the preferred field of
activity [26 Der Macher; 72 Metzler, p 364–5]. According to
Ehmke and the new departmental head, political scientist
Reimut Jochimsen, planning should now be anchored in
all sections via so-called planning plenipotentiaries. Thus,
planning now incorporated not only economic policy (in
the sense of Keynesianism) but all political fields. Above
and beyond this, the temporal horizon of planning was
now extended and conceived for the medium to long term,
for between 5 and 15 years. As planning was predestined
to develop “strategic concepts for the solution of complex
political problems under consideration of their contexts
and longer-term consequences”, the connection to systems
analytical models, which explored the inner correlations of
the system, was obvious.15
Koelle of the Centre Berlin contactedMinisterialrat Adolf
Theis from the planning department of the Chancellery, who
was also the chairperson of the Project Group for Government
and Administrative Reform. Theis invited Koelle to give a
paper before the Project Group for Government and
Administrative Reform. After Koelle’s presentation, Theis
stated almost euphorically that the Centre Berlin would offer
expertise in the area of planning, data preparation, decision
models and operations research “that is, at least currently,
unique in West Germany”.16 Thus, the Centre Berlin for
Futures Research received various commissions from the
Federal Government. For one, the Project Group for
Government and Administrative Reform participated in the
Berlin Simulation Model (BESI), which the Centre Berlin for
Futures Research drew up for the Berlin state government as a
model “for studying the development and restructuring of
large cities”. Koelle and seven other academics from an inter-
disciplinary team constructed an early warning system that
was initially designed to divide the “‘condition’ of a social
system” into individual activity sectors and then split these up
into components. At the same time, indicators should be used
to gather the most important characteristics of this condition.
The thoroughness of this gathering was, according to Koelle,
who completely underestimated the social and political com-
plexities, “primarily a question of applied effort”. Beyond
that, the decision-makers would have to develop short-,
medium- and long-term aims; here, for example, the govern-
ment declaration of the lord mayor of West-Berlin, divided
into variables, could be fed in. The decision-makers should
also determine target values for the indicators, concepts of
time for when the target values should be reached, and thresh-
olds for defining the parameters of the aims. The fact that a
government declaration was difficult to quantify and divide
into factors was evidently not considered. After the indicators
were assigned with concrete data, a “warning system” was to
issue a timely signal if one of the indicators threatened to
exceed the set thresholds. The information system was to
reproduce and simulate the possible consequences of planned
decisions.17 Thus, the simulation model was based on the
14 First information broschure of the “Zentrum Berlin für
Zukunftsforschung”(Centre Berlin for Futures Research ) .
Bundesarchiv, B 138, 1550.
15 Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt ), Planungsstab, Ausbau der
politischen Planung im BKA, 20th Oct 1969, Bundesarchiv, B 136,
14064; see Jochimsen 1971; Süß, 2003, pp 361–4; 72 Metzler, p. 354–6.
16 Project Group for Government and Administrative Reform, Theis,
23th Nov 1970, cited in paper Seiler, 16th May 1973, Bundesarchiv, B
106, 49611; Minutes of the meeting of the “Vorstand” Centre Berlin for
Futures Research held on 9th July 1970, Archives of the Institut für
Zeitgeschichte, ED 701, 40.
17 15 Birreck & Koelle; see Chancellery, Minutes planning meeting held
on 12th June 1970, Bundesarchiv, B 136, 14064; Minutes
Bundeskanzleramt meeting held on 3rd Dec 1970, ibid, 14536.
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certainty that it could quantify and formalise social processes,
and this concept epitomised nothing less than a euphoria of
steering.
Second, the Centre Berlin was commissioned by the plan-
ning department of the Chancellery and the Project Group for
Government and Administrative Reform to handle the project
PLABUND (Planning Aid in the Federal Administration). For
this it received the princely sum of two million marks. The
overall concept, according to the Centre Berlin, was guided by
the idea that “planning processes in the field of federal admin-
istration […] can only be decisively improved by means of
specific planning aid that has been coordinated in its function-
al profile”.18 Thus, the project aimed at “rationalisation”, i.e.
the creation of scientificity and efficiency in process planning.
The core was the project EIPE (Experimental Integrating
Planning and Decision-making System), led by the sociologist
Helmut Klages. It aimed at developing “foundations and
design criteria for the construction of an interagency informa-
tion system in the area of government and administration”.
According to the abstruse formulations, it attempted to do
research on the “space for deliberation of preparatory work
for decisions” within the basic units of the federal administra-
tion, i.e. the decision-making processes and the scope of
action. So far, the preparation of decisions in the individual
sections seemed to impede the decision-makers, i.e. the min-
isters, in making assessments within the overall political con-
cept. In this way, “non-rational determinants of political-
administration action” were to be reduced.19 The project team
ascertained “fundamental assumptions and allocated informa-
tion holdings” of the administrators “on social, economic and
political prerequisites”. This was to take place empirically by
means of “participatory observation”. Staff of the Centre
Berlin (two political scientists, a sociologist and a economist)
was therefore appointed for 3 months to four ministries as
assistant administrators. Parallel to this, intensive interviews
of the administration with the Centre staff were to take place.
The information acquired was to be gathered in a “categorial
filing arsenal”, i.e. quantified.20 In principle, it was thus
attempted to gauge information flow within the ministry, to
rationalise working processes and make them more transpar-
ent, and to examine the room for manoeuvre possessed by the
administration and to what extent the administration could be
synchronised with the political line. On this basis, an
information system should be developed that would be of
value to an early warning system.
Yet the consultation process turned out to be sobering.
BESI was cancelled whilst still in its pilot phase because the
Project Group for Government and Administrative Reform
and the Berlin state government discontinued the funding step
by step in 1972 and 1974, respectively. EIPE quickly met with
resistance from the ministerial bureaucracy in the Chancellery,
which criticised the lack of administrative experience among
the futures researchers. The Centre Berlin for Futures
Research argued that the administration insulated itself
“against the general availability of experience and background
knowledge”.21 The approach of measuring the room of ma-
noeuvre of the administration in order to bring it more strongly
in line with politics did indeed lead to concerns that leeway
could be restricted. Theis, who had initially been so positive,
criticised the lack of intelligibility on the part of the texts.
Ultimately the Project Group argued that the undertaking
lacked “the necessary autonomy”.22 The Centre Berlin would
have to be satisfied with continuing to accept ideas from the
Federal Government and convert them into the “inflated ZBZ [=
Centre Berlin] language”.23 The Project Group for Government
and Administrative Reform now focused on a study carried out
by the consultants McKinsey. In contrast to the Centre Berlin,
McKinsey was seen as having a “pragmatic approach”. 24 The
“practical use” of EIPE, on the other hand, was called into
question.25
Consequently, the Centre Berlin’s policy advice to the
government quickly ran into problems. Both the computer-
assisted simulation, which simulated and anticipated the con-
sequences of decisions (BESI), as well as consulting in the
area of process planning (EIPE), ended more or less without
success. It was of central importance that the interaction
between the futures researchers, politics and the ministerial
bureaucracy was full of tension. This had its roots in the
inflated expectations that politicians had in futures research
as well as those which futures researchers had in themselves.
The Centre Berlin declared itself responsible for all political
fields and yet always competed with specialists. The futures
researchers overestimated the capacity of systems analytical
models for solving problems and the rules and system char-
acter of social structures and processes. Furthermore, they
18 Centre Berlin for Futures Research, Outline on PLABUND, 26th April
1973, Bundesarchiv, B 106, 54323.
19 Centre Berlin, Outline on EIPE, 13th April 1973, Bundesarchiv, B 106,
54323, and Centre Berlin, Outline on EIPE, undated, ibid, 49611; Project
Group, Paper Randel, 22nd Sept 1972, ibid; see for this Seefried 2010, p.
131–4.
20 Centre Berlin, Outline on EIPE, 13th April 1973, Bundesarchiv, B 106,
54323; Project Group, Randel, Paper on Meeting with Centre Berlin held
on 2nd Jan 1973, ibid, 49611.
21 Centre Berlin, Second Interim Report, Jan 1973, cited in 16 Birreck,
Kolb, Rosolski, p 14.
22 Project Group, Thomas paper, 19th Sept 1972, Randel paper, 22th Sept
1972, Seiler Paper, 16th May 1973, Bundesarchiv, B 106, 49611.
23 Project Group, Minutes of a meeting held on 26th April 1973,
Bundesarchiv, B 106, 49611.
24 German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology, Minutes of
PLABUND meeting held on 30th May 1973, Bundesarchiv, B 106,
49611; Project Group to Jochimsen, 27th Apr 1971, Archiv für soziale
Demokratie, Jochimsen Papers, 1/RJAC0000039-40.
25 Project Group, Minutes of EIPE meeting, 2nd March 1973,
Bundesarchiv, B 106, 49611.
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spoke a different language to the ministerial bureaucracy; the
Centre Berlin had developed its own system language perme-
ated with cybernetics, which was not compatible with the
ministerial bureaucracy, most of whom had a background in
law [40 Hegelau, p 169; 9 Bebermeyer, p 18–9]. It was
decisive that the Centre Berlin assumed that it could gather
problem scenarios and decision-making processes “complete-
ly” and quantify them. Model simulations attempt to imitate
and to visualise the complexity of reality, but they can supply
only fragmentary knowledge on a virtual model world, which
cannot depict social complexity [65 Lenhard]. In an engineer-
ing mentality of feasibility, the Centre Berlin ignored the fact
that decision-making in politics cannot be completely
modelled or, even more so, quantified [76 Porter]. It was
ultimately overlooked that the interaction between state guid-
ance, societal change and the influence of experts – experts
such as the Centre Berlin itself – were much more complex
than it was possible to depict in a model [91 Seefried, pp 393–
5; 84 Schanetzky]. Fundamental problems of the planning
department certainly also played a role. The Project Group
for Government and Administrative Reform was disbanded,
not least due to criticism of the far-reaching planning projects
of the Chancellery formed in the Ministries that feared a
reduction in their influence. In the cabinet, in which the view
of the planning department as a “child’s steam engine” did the
rounds, the ambitious Ehmke came under pressure. Finance
Minister Helmut Schmidt, an opponent of the planning con-
cepts, prevented a direct coordination of financial and task
planning between the Finance Ministry and the Chancellery
and, not least as a result of rivalries in the cabinet, Ehmke had
to switch to the Technology Ministry in 1972 [47 Jäger, p 33;
95 Süß, pp 369–77; 85 Schatz]. It furthermore became clear in
summer 1971 that the budget did not offer sufficient funds for
all the reform projects that had been drawn up by the Brandt
government. The oil crisis of 1973 and the economic crisis
then pulled the rug out from under the planning department, as
the planning group was not “suitable for moderating conflicts
of allocation against the backdrop of limited resources” [95
Süß, p 375].
However, the Centre Berlin for Futures Research learned
from these problems. A policy paper from 1975, composed by
the new deputy chairperson Rainer Mackensen, a sociologist,
regarded the task of futures research as doing the spadework
for political decision-making in the interests of the people. It
conducted research, he continued, on possible developments,
the extent to which they could be evaluated vis-à-vis various
objectives and the extent to which they could be influenced by
public decisions. Improving the life of many seemed to be
much more important than the “impressive demonstration of
technical capacity”. For this, futures research should use tan-
gible social scientific, systems analytical and technical pro-
cesses. Futures research helped to utilise the potential for a
“more comprehensive consideration of public decisions” [68
Mackensen]. The distancing from the phase of model simula-
tion is very apparent here. Futures research was now aimed at
integrating systems analysis and modelling into a mixture of
methods under the banner of a reflected, socially-orientated
understanding of the “discipline”. This understanding was
pragmatic because it balanced the possibilities and limits of
futures research and realistically assessed them.
Conclusions
The founding years of futures research were turbulent. The
field of futures research was conceptualised in a process of
transnational circulation of knowledge in Western Europe and
the USA between the late 1950s and the late 1960s. The
different approaches to thinking about, forecasting and plan-
ning the future shared the conviction that many possible
futures existed to be investigated and created. And they shared
the perception of technological and social acceleration derived
from the techno-scientific developments that had occurred
since 1945, which had to be steered by using modern and
“rational” methods and techniques mostly originating from
US think tanks.
The exponents of the futures field produced scientific ex-
pertise for policy development and strategic planning. The
background to this was a far-reaching understanding of plan-
ning derived from politics, which partly possessed euphoric
traits. Futures research could doubtlessly attract the interest of
the Federal Government because it appeared to bemodern and
“rational”, interdisciplinary and very much “Western” and
American influenced. If one looks at the knowledge formats
and methods of futures research offered for scientific policy
advice, the exponents of a critical-emancipatory approach
(such as Jungk) did not regard it as its principal aim to
generate employable knowledge but rather to focus on the
critical public and to discuss alternative futures with the “cit-
izen”. Regarding the normative-ontological field, the Max-
Planck-Institute was limited in its political advisory capacity
but fulfilled autonomously the “war consequences” study that
combined computer simulations and qualitative scenarios and
produced employable knowledge. Ultimately, the Centre
Berlin for Futures Research represented the positivist-empir-
ical approach. Even beyond the examples already cited above,
it constructed broad-brush models, which used cybernetic-
inspired computer simulations to calculate the consequences
of alternative decisions and drew up Systems Analysis studies
of organisational and procedural structures. It was precisely
here that a degree of certainty dominated whereby futures
research would be able to forecast and steer the future exactly.
This certainty possessed scientistic traits and had a euphoric
touch. Hence, the Centre Berlin’s policy advice to the govern-
ment quickly ran into problems as the futures researchers
overestimated the capacity of systems analysis and modelling
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as well as the system character of social structures and
processes.
In the early 1970s, the confidence of many futures re-
searchers in modelling and steering the future was shattered.
One reason for this were the outlined problems in utilizing
future expertise in government. In general, futures research
underwent a tremendous change in the early 1970s. The book
“The Limits to Growth” from 1972 epitomized a breakthrough
of newmodes of thinking about the future, as it conveyed both
an “old” belief in computer simulations and global planning as
well as a deep questioning of economic growth and technol-
ogy. Significant sections of futures research came under the
sway of an orientation towards ecology and human beings,
their needs and values, rejecting a “cool” techno-scientific and
“material”-based understanding of progress [96 Seefried]. As
a result, major strands of futures research in the 1970s aban-
doned large-scale and quantitative-based concepts of steering
the future, developing instead a pragmatic and human-centred
approach to thinking about and planning the future.
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